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IS THE MARKET OVER-OPTIMISTIC ABOUT THE PROSPECTS OF FIRMS 
THAT ISSUE EQUITY? EVIDENCE FOR THE SPANISH MARKET 
 




Previous evidence has documented that equity issuers underperform in the long-run. 
One possible explanation is that investors have overoptimistic expectations regarding future 
earnings and the underperformance occurs as these expectations are corrected over time. Our 
central focus is to test this hypothesis for Spanish rights issuing firms, for that, firstly we 
examine analysts’ predictions about future earnings of these companies. We observe that 
forecasts are unusually favourable and, moreover, the post-offering underperformance is most 
pronounced when analyst predictions have higher optimistic bias. Secondly, we study the 
market response to issuing firms’ earnings announcements in the post-offering period 
observing a significant negative reaction. So the evidence in this paper is consistent with the 
excessive optimism hypothesis about issuing firms.  
Keywords: Corporate Finance, Seasoned Equity Offerings, Earnings Forecasting. 
JEL classification: G14, G32. 
RESUMEN 
 
Evidencia previa ha documentado que las empresas que amplían capital experimentan 
rentabilidades anormales negativas en el largo plazo. Una posible explicación es que los 
inversores tienen expectativas excesivamente optimistas sobre los beneficios futuros de estas 
compañías y la evolución observada se debe a la corrección gradual de este exceso de 
optimismo. El principal objeto de este trabajo es contrastar esta hipótesis para las emisiones 
con derechos en el mercado español. Para ello, en primer lugar se examinan los pronósticos de 
los analistas sobre los beneficios futuros de las empresas emisoras. Se observa que las 
predicciones para estas compañías son inusualmente favorables y, además, la peor evolución a 
largo plazo es más pronunciada cuando las predicciones son más optimistas.  En segundo 
lugar, se estudia la reacción del mercado a los anuncios de beneficios de las compañías 
emisoras los años siguientes a la oferta, observando una reacción significativamente negativa. 
Por tanto, la evidencia aportada en este trabajo es consistente con la hipótesis de expectativas 
excesivamente optimistas sobre las empresas que deciden ampliar capital.  
Palabras claves: Finanzas corporativas, ampliaciones de capital, predicciones de 
beneficios.   3
1.  Introduction 
One of the puzzles of the modern financial literature is the negative long-run abnormal 
returns following equity issues. In an efficient capital market the information provided by this 
event should be reflected in stock prices in the announcement and no abnormal performance 
should appear afterwards. However, extant studies have documented negative long-run 
abnormal returns up to five years after equity offerings. Loughran and Ritter (1995, 1997), 
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1995), Lee (1997) and Jegadeesh (2000) document this anomaly 
for firm commitments offerings in the US market. The evidence for rights issues also show 
long-run post-issue underperformance: Cai (1998) and Kang, Kim and Stulz (1999) in Japan; 
Jeanneret (2000) in the French market; Stehle, Ehrhardt and Przyborowsky (2000) in 
Germany; and Pastor and Martín (2001, 2004) in Spain. 
The interpretation of the above pattern has been the subject of considerable debate. On 
one hand, several authors document important biases in measuring and testing returns in large 
periods, thus the long-run abnormal returns could be explained by these biases (Barber and 
Lyon, 1997; Kothari and Warner, 1997; Lyon, Barber and Tsay, 1999). However, recent 
studies have included substantial improvements in the methodology employed in order to 
minimise the influence of these biases and their results continue showing long-run 
underperformance of issuing firms in relation to non-issuers. On the other hand, some authors 
suggest that it is the correction of investors’ optimistic expectations of future performance that 
causes the long-run underperformance in stock returns (Loughran and Ritter, 1997; Kang, Kim 
and Stulz, 1999; Jegadeesh, 2000). 
Several studies have tried to test this optimistic expectations hypothesis. As the market 
expectations are not observable, some authors examine the optimism reflected in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts to provide indirect evidence regarding the market optimism. In this context, 
Ali (1996) and Teoh and Wong (2002) document that one-year analysts’ earnings forecasts for 
issuing firms have higher optimistic bias than for non-issuers in the period of five years 
following the offering. However, Hansen and Sarin (1998) document that one-year earnings 
prediction for equity issuers around the offering are not more favourable than for non-issuing 
firms. The results in relation to long-term growth forecast around equity issues are not 
conclusive either. Hansen and Sarin (1998) reject that long-run growth forecasts are more 
favourable for issuing firms, but the results obtained by Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000) are   4
consistent with the existence of an overly optimistic bias in long-run growth prospects around 
equity offerings. 
Another trend of investigation examines investors’ reaction to post-issue earnings 
announcements as a direct test of the optimistic expectations hypothesis. Cornett, Mehran and 
Tehranian (1998) study post-issue performance for a sample of publicly traded commercial 
banks. They find that voluntary issue equity exhibit post-offering long-run underperformance 
and, moreover, these firms experience a negative market reaction to quarterly earning 
announcements following the issue. Rangan (1998), Jegadeesh (2000) and Denis and Sarin 
(2001) also examine abnormal returns around earnings announcement following the offering 
and they report that earnings announcement are associate with significantly negative abnormal 
returns. However, the evidence in Shivakumar (2000) and Brous, Datar and Kini (2001) 
suggests that investors are not disappointed by earnings announcements that follow seasoned 
equity offerings. 
On one hand, this paper extends previous literature analysing for the first time the 
existence of overoptimistic expectations for rights offerings. Although there is evidence of 
long-run stock price underperformance following equity issues with rights, all extant studies 
trying to test the overoptimistic hypothesis has focused on firm commitments offerings. A 
priori, what we would expect is that in rights issues the level of optimism in expectations was 
lower, in relation to firm commitments, given that in rights offerings potential purchasers for 
new shares are basically current shareholders.  
On the other hand, given that the evidence about the optimistic expectations hypothesis 
for firm commitments is mixed, we try in our study to improve methodology and to use 
different procedures to test this hypothesis in order to clarify if the excessive optimism can 
explain the equity issue puzzle. In particular, we introduce a multivariate regression analysis 
using data panel that complement the usual descriptive univariate analysis applied in this 
context. 
Firstly we examine analysts’ errors in their prospects of future earnings. We observe 
that analysts’ earnings forecasts for rights issuers are unusually favourable and, moreover, the 
poor long-run performance is more pronounced for issuing firms with more optimistic 
predictions. Secondly, we focus on post-issue earnings announcement effects observing a 
negative   reaction   to  earning  announcements  the  years  following  the  offering.  Thus,  the    5
evidence in this paper is consistent with the existence of excessive optimism about rights 
issuing firms’ future earnings.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the sample selection procedure and 
data sources. Section 3 examines the long-term stock-price performance of Spanish rights 
issues. In section 4 we study analysts’ forecast errors in their predictions about future earnings 
of issuing firms and the explicative power of these errors in long-run returns. Section 5 
analyses the market reaction to post-offering earning announcements. Finally, conclusions are 
presented. 
2.  Sample and data sources 
To identify firms issuing equity, we use the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores (C.N.M.V.)
1 register. During the period from April 1989 to December 1996, 125 rights 
offerings of listed firms are located.  
To isolate the effect of long-run equity issues, we exclude firms that are the object of 
any decision or special situation in the three-year post-issue period, which may affect results. 
Specifically, we remove firms that issue convertible bonds, are involved in any merger, 
acquisition or takeover processes in this period, suffer a stoppage of payments, or are 
preventively or definitively excluded in listing. Additionally, in order to avoid cross-section 
dependence, if an issue of a firm is included in the final sample, no other issue of the same 
firm in the three-year post-issue period is included. Furthermore, to compute long-run 
abnormal returns we need size and book-to-market data of issuing firms at the end of the year 
prior to the offering. This leaves us with 44 rights offerings in our sample. 
In table 1 size and book-to-market ratios of issuing firms are compared with the values 
of these variables for the market.
2 We observe that issuing firms are statistically significantly 
smaller and they are high growth firms. 
                                                 
1 This Spanish institution is the equivalent of the American S.E.C. 
2 To determine values for the market, we have employed all the firms with size and book-to-market values 
available in December of the year prior to the offering.   6
 
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR FIRM CHARACTERISTICS OF EQUITY RIGHTS ISSUES 
 





1  277.17 141.05  1592.35 15.60  317.81 
  BTM
2  1.08 0.80 3.65 0.19 0.81 
         
Market  Firm size 
(millions of €)
1  569.37 519.64 845.72 435.59 134.11 
 BTM
2  1.36 1.29 2.41 0.76 0.60 
1The firm size at month t is measured as its number of stocks in December of the previous year multiplied by the stock price 
at the end of the previous month.
 
2 BTM is the book to market ratio, measured at month t as the book value of common stock in December of the previous year 
relative to the firm size at the end of the previous month. 
 
To measure long-run stock price performance, monthly returns adjusted by dividends, 
rights issues and splits are employed. This information comes from the Spanish Stock 
Exchange (SSE). We also need information from the Institutional Brokers Estimation System 
(IBES) database about analysts’ predictions of issuing firms’ future earnings. In particular, we 
used the following forecasts: (i) one-year earning forecasts made by analysts the year previous 
to the offering, the year of the offering and in each of the three years following the issue; (ii) 
two-year earning predictions made by analysts the year previous to the offering, the year of the 
offering and the following one (iii) three-year earning forecasts made by analysts the year 
previous to the offering, the year of the offering and the following one. 
Analysts’ prediction data for the 44 companies are not available for all the selected 
dates, so the analysis is carried out for the companies with analysts’ prediction data available. 
To measure forecast errors we compare the mean analysts’ forecast with the actual earning 
that is also available in IBES database. In order to test if analysts’ predictions for issuing firms 
are unusually favourable, we compare the forecast error for each issuing firm with forecast   7
errors in the same dates for non-issuer control firms
3. Predictions and earnings data for control 
firms are also obtained from IBES database. 
For the analysis of the post-issue earnings announcement effects, we collect the four 
annual earning announcement dates subsequent to the issue from JCF Quant file.
4 In 
particular, the announcement of the issue-year earning (which is published at the beginning of 
the following year) and the three subsequent annual earning announcements. We extract daily 
issuing firms’ returns from the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE). 
3.  Long-Run performance of post-issue stock returns 
In this section we study the long-run market reaction to equity rights issues. For that, 
we calculate the abnormal return in the analysis period,  , i ACoR τ , as the compound return of 
the issuing firm minus the compound expected return: 
∏ ∏
= =
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Given that the empirical evidence has demonstrated that the size and book to market 
ratio (BTM) explain the cross-section variability of stocks returns, to estimate expected returns 
we select reference portfolios on the basis of these control variables. Firstly, we select for each 
issuing firm, with an event date, its non-issuers group. The non-issuers group is composed of 
firms that do not issue equity either in the three-year period previous to the event date or in the 
three-year period following it. For each issuing, non-issuer companies are grouped in size 
quartiles, BTM quartiles or size-and-BTM quartiles at the end of the pre-issue year. The 
expected return is the return of the issue firm quartile. 
                                                 
3 Analysts made their predictions about the earning for a given year each month until the earning announcement. 
Companies announce their results in the six-month period following the end of the year, although the exact date 
differs for each firm. It is expected that with the passage of time forecasts become more accurate, thus to compare 
forecast error for issuers and non-issuers we have to analyse predictions in the same month for both groups. We 
choose December as the month in which we study forecasts errors for issuers and non-issuers. However, for the 
year of the offering we analyse the predictions in the month previous to the announcement and in the following 
one in order to detect possible changes in analysts’ forecast due to the offering announcement. 
4 Earning announcement data started in 1991 so we do not have the four earning announcements dates for all 
issuing firm. The analysis will be carried out in each date with the data available.   8
In order to test the statistical significance of the abnormal returns, we first compute t 
statistics for the different normal return estimation procedures. Moreover, as the distribution of 
long-run abnormal returns is positively skewed when reference portfolios are employed to 
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sample mean and cross-sectional standard deviation of abnormal returns for the sample of N 
events. 
Table 2 reports abnormal returns computed using different benchmarks to estimate 
expected returns for different intervals following the issue, as well as the results of the 
statistical tests. We observe that issuing firms under-perform their benchmarks in the three 
years post-issue period; moreover, results are highly significant whatever the benchmark 
employed. 
TABLE 2. STOCK RETURN LONG-RUN PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING THE ISSUE 
 
Year after the SEO    +1  +2  +3 
        
Size portfolio  AACoR ( %)  -8.19  -23.77  -35.27 
  t stat.  -1.86*  -3.90***  -3.05*** 
  t skewness-adjust.  -1.78*  -3.39***  -2.26** 
        
BTM portfolio  AACoR ( %)       
  t stat.  -8.33  -22.22  -26.26 
  t skewness-adjust.  -2.06**  -3.63***  -2.25** 
   -1.97**  -2.95***  -1.75* 
Size-BTM portfolio  AACoR ( %)       
  t stat.  -6.63  -20.55  -26.38 
  t skewness-adjust.  -1.58  -3.56***  -2.42** 
   -1.56 -3.03***  -1.84* 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999) advocate the use of this statistic originally developed by Johnson (1978).   9
4.  Analysts’ forecasting errors around the offering 
The focus of this part of the paper is to test the optimistic expectations hypothesis 
about rights issues examining analysts’ predictions about future earnings for these companies. 
If forecasts for issuing firms are unusually favourable this would support this hypothesis. In 
this context, it is important to notice that previous evidence documents that analysts’ prospects 
are, in mean, optimistically biased.
6 Thus, our interest is to analyse if the optimistic bias in 
analysts’ forecast about issuing firms is higher than the bias usually made by analysts in their 
predictions. In particular, we analyse if in the years around the offering there is a significant 
difference between the forecast errors for issuers and non-issuers. 
4.1.  Univariate tests 
The forecast error results from the difference between the actual and forecasted earning 
per share. Obviously, to make this magnitude of the forecast error comparable between firms a 
deflator must be used. However, previous literature lacks a consensus regarding the use of the 
deflator. The commonly used deflator is the stock price (Brous, 1992; Ali, 1996; Rajan and 
Servaes, 1997; Hansen and Sarin, 1998; Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki, 2001; Doukas, Kim 
and Pantzalis, 2001; Teoh and Wong, 2002; Marciukaityte and Szewczyk, 2001). The 
rationale to choose the stock price deflator rather than the earning per share is to improve the 
statistical properties of the errors predictions series and then, the reliability of the test.
7 
However, Mian and Teo (2001) argue that if stocks have different earnings-to-price 
ratios, cross-sectional comparisons of forecast errors using stock price deflator may lead to 
spurious results. For example, suppose two stocks A and B with different prices, 2 € and 1 €, 
respectively but with the same earning per share prediction of 0.02. Imagine that the actual 
earning per share of both stocks turn out to be half than of what were anticipated, 0.01. If we 
use the stock price as the deflator, the forecast error in absolute value would be 0.005 for stock 
A and 0.01 for stock B, when for both stocks the error made by analysts is the same.  
                                                 
6 Elton, Gruber and Gultein (1984); Brown, Foster and Noreen (1985); O’Brien (1988); Dreman and Berry 
(1995); McNichols and O’Brien (1997); Brown (1996, 1997); Hansen and Sarin (1998); Larrán and Rees (1999); 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (2000). 
7 Using the actual or forecasted earning as deflator implies the possibility of having in the denominator a number 
closely to zero or zero. In this context, Dreman and Berry (1995) document that a big number of outliers arise 
when the earning or the prediction are used as deflator.   10
This example serves to illustrate that using stock price deflator implies more weight for 
forecast errors of stocks with low prices relative to actual or forecasted earnings. Therefore, 
firms with higher actual or forecasted earning in relation to price presents an upward bias in 
absolute value forecast errors.
8 This bias in the cross-sectional comparison of forecast errors 
for firms with different earning-to-price ratio if the forecast errors are deflated by stock prices, 
leads Mian and Teo (2001) to defend the absolute value of actual or forecasted earning per 
share as deflators, in spite of the statistical problems previously commented. 
We analyse if, as Mian and Teo (2001) argue, firms with higher actual or forecasted 
earning in relation to price present upward bias in forecast errors when stock price is used as 
deflator. We compute, for every firm in IBES database, forecast errors deflated by stock price 
in December of each year in the sample period. We observe that forecast errors in absolute 
value present a significant positive correlation with the actual and forecasted earning to price 
ratio. This correlation is not significant when errors are deflated by the absolute value of 
forecasted earning (see Appendix).  
These results are similar to those obtained by Hansen and Sarin (1998) and agree with 
the argument of Mian and Teo (2001). Thus, if we use stock price deflator differences in 
forecast errors between issuers and non-issuers could arise if they have different earning-to-
price ratios. In this context, firstly we compute forecast errors scaled by stock prices given the 
better statistical properties; but, to avoid the problems that could arise in cross-sectional 
comparisons of forecast errors if firms have different earning-to-price ratio, we compare the 
forecast errors deflated by price of issuing firms with errors for non-issuers with similar ratio. 
In particular, for each issuing firm, non-issuer companies are grouped in quartiles on the basis 
on the forecasted earning-to-price ratio and we compare the error for each issuing firm with 
the error for its non-issuers quartile. Secondly, we compute forecast errors using the absolute 
value of forecasted earning as deflator, as Mian and Teo (2001) defend. In this case the control 
group for each issuing firm is its non-issuers group. 
                                                 
8 Hansen and Sarin (1998), using stock price as the deflator forecast error, document that optimistic bias in 
analysts’ predictions is higher for companies with higher forecasted earning-to-price ratios. However, this result 
could be due to the spurious relationship between earning-to-price ratios and forecasted errors deflated by stock 
prices. Other studies that could be possibly affected by this bias are those that, using stock price deflator, 
document that firms with higher book to market ratios have higher forecast errors in absolute value (Richardson, 
Teoh and Wysocki, 2000; Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis, 2001). These results could be due to the positive 
correlation between book-to-market and earning-to-price ratios. Mian and Teo (2001) document no significant 
relation between book-to-market ratio and forecast errors deflated by earning.   11
To test if the mean forecast error for issuing firms is equal to the mean error for non-
issuers we employ a bootstrap  procedure because we consider restrictive to suppose a 
distribution of forecast errors.
9 With the bootstrap technique we generate the forecast errors 
empirical distribution for the non-issuers control group and we employ this distribution to 
evaluate the statistical significance of the issuing firm mean forecast error. Specifically, for 
each issuing firm, we randomly select, with replacement, a firm that is in its control group. 
Repeating this process for all issuing firms we obtain one pseudo-portfolio with firms 
randomly selected that have not issued. Then, we compute the mean forecast error of this 
pseudo-portfolio. This process is repeated 10,000 times to obtain the empirical distribution of 
non-issuing mean forecast error. This distribution is used to fix the percentiles to test equality 
between issuing and the pseudo-portfolio mean forecast error. 
Panel A of table 3 show the results for short-term predictions. Specifically, we analyse 
on-year predictions made by analysts the year prior to the issue, the year of the offering and in 
the three years following the issue. We observe that one-year earning predictions for issuing 
firms in every selected date are in mean optimistic, that is, the mean analysts’ prediction is 
higher than the actual earning. Furthermore, forecast errors are higher the years following the 
offering. Similar evidence is documented by Hansen and Sarin (1998) and Marciukaityte and 
Szewczyk (2001), and is consistent with the argument that in the years following the offering 
the good expectations about issuing firms’ earnings are not confirmed. 
Comparing forecasting errors for issuers and non-issuers we observe that in the year 
previous to the offering the mean forecast error made by analysts for issuing firms is not 
significantly different from the prediction error for non-issuers. However, in the year of the 
offering and in each of the following three years, forecast errors are significantly more 
negative for issuing firms sample. Moreover, results are robust to the deflator employed.  
Thus, the evidence here shows that the optimistic bias in expectations about post-
offering earnings is significantly higher. Additionally, this excessive optimism does not 
disappear immediately, it continues in the three-year period following the offering. These 
results are consistent with Ali (1996) and Teoh and Wong (2002). 
                                                 
9 With the Jarque-Bera test the normality of the forecast errors distribution is rejected.   12
 
TABLE 3. ANALYSTS’ FORECASTING ERRORS AROUND THE OFFERING 
 
  Price Deflated Error



























    
Panel A. One-Year Predictions    
                       
Issuers  -2.33 -1.67  -2.39 -4.92  -4.62  -11.96    -11.12 -15.66 -33.99 -82.70 -76.48  -119.6 
Non-Issuers  -0.69 0.16  0.12 -0.47  -1.05  -0.87    -3.17 2.55 -0.21 -1.92  -4.49  -0.82 
Bootstrap  
p-value 
(0.17) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)    (0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) 
# of firms  33 34  34 33  37  36    33 34 34 33 37  36 
    
Panel B. Two-Year Predictions    
                       
Issuers  -4.22 -4.18  -5.42 -3.72        -26.71  -53.63 -58.89  -58.09     
Non-Issuers  -0.81 -0.52  0.05 -0.67        -4.30  0.31  5.09  4.39     
Bootstrap  
p-value 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)        (0.05) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00)     
# of firms  31 33  33 35     31  33  33  35   
    
Panel C. Three-Year Predictions    
                       
Issuers  -5.46 -7.46  -6.34 -5.55        -30.87  -73.59 -77.09  -81.25    
Non-Issuers  -0.94 -0.44  -1.20 -1.30       -7.89  -4.21  -12.23  -8.58   
Bootstrap  
p-value 
(0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01)        (0.02) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.01)    
# of firms  25 34  34 30     25  34  34  30   
1 Price deflated error is computed as the actual earning per share minus the mean forecasted earning per share divided by the 
stock price the month in which the prediction is made. Thus, a negative forecast error implies optimistic bias. 
2 Forecast deflated error is computed as the actual earning per share minus the mean forecasted earning per share divided by 
the absolute value of the forecasted earning. Thus, a negative forecast error implies optimistic bias. 
 
Several authors suggest that the use of one-year earning forecasts as a measure of 
expectations could be limited because the issuing firms’ poor performance continues several 
years after the offering. Thus the use of long-term forecast could be more appropriate to test 
the overly optimistic expectation hypothesis (Hansen and Sarin, 1998; Dechow, Hutton and 
Sloan, 2000). In this context, these authors employ five-year growth earning forecasts 
available in IBES database. However, for our sample of issuing firms there are very few five-
year growth earning forecasts available. Furthermore, as the evidence in the Spanish stock 
market is that equity issuers underperform from one to three years following the offering, we 
consider appropriate to use as long-term predictions two- and three-year earning forecasts. 
Concretely, we analyse two- and three-year earning predictions made by analysts the year 
before the offering, the year of the issue and the following one.   13
Panels B and C of table 3 show that long-term predictions about issuing firms’ earnings 
are, as well as short-term prediction, optimistically biased. That is, the two- and three-year 
forecast made by analysts are in mean higher than the actual earning for every selected date. 
Comparing forecast errors for issuing firms with analysts forecasting errors for non-issuers 
control groups, we observe that for every selected date the error made by analysts in their two- 
and three- year predictions about issuing firms’ earnings is significantly more negative than 
the error for non-issuers. In sum, results show that analysts are overly optimistic about post-
offering issuing firms’ earnings. 
Clayman and Schwartz (1994), Dowen (1996), Bulter and Saraoglu (1999), Mian and 
Teo (2001) document that the optimistic bias in forecast errors is higher when the actual 
earning is negative
10. We analyse forecast errors in the sample period and we observe that 
firms with negative actual earnings have significantly more optimistic bias (more negative 
forecast errors) both if price or forecasted earning is used as deflator. In order to check to what 
extent results in table 3 are affected by the higher optimistic bias of companies with negative 
earnings, we repeat the analysis exclusively for the firms with positive earnings
11. Table 4 
shows that the sample of issuing firms with positive earnings presents an optimistic bias, 
lower than the bias for the global sample, consistent with the argument that optimistic bias in 
analysts’ predictions is more pronounced for firms with negative earnings.  
Comparing one-year forecast errors for issuing companies with positive earnings with 
the error for their non-issuers control groups, we observe that in the year previous to the 
offering there is no significant difference. In relation to the forecasts made the year of the 
offering and the following one, the optimistic bias for issuing companies is significantly 
higher than the bias for non-issuers. However, for the second and third year following the 
issue prediction errors for equity issuers with positive earning are not significantly different 
from the error for non-issuers. Thus, the high optimistic bias observed in these years when we 
analyse the global sample seems to be due to the proportion of companies with losses 
following the offering. 
                                                 
10 Analysts are reluctant to publish negative earning forecasts, they usually made positive earning prospects even 
when the actual earning is negative. Moreover, even if predictions are negative they are usually overly optimistic.  
11 Repeating the analysis for issuing firms with positive earning can give us an idea of to what extent results for 
the global sample are affected by firms with losses. We do not consider appropriate to repeat the analysis 
exclusively for firms with negative earning due to the small sample size (the number of companies with losses 
ranges between 3 and 8 depending on the prediction date).     14
TABLE 4. ANALYSTS’ ERRORS AROUND THE OFFERING FOR FIRMS WITH POSITIVE EARNINGS 
 
  Price Deflated Error



























    
Panel A. One-Year Predictions     
    
Issuers  -1.08 -1.29 -1.39 -1.57 -0.63 -0.19   -12.59  -10.35  -13.58  -31.84 -4.29  0.19 
Non-Issuers -0.33 0.01 -0.12 0.11 -0.26 -0.59   -3.66  1.71  -0.40 -0.42 -2.57  3.89 
Bootstrap  
p-value 
(0.13) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.82)   (0.19) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.75) (0.79) 
#  of  firms  30  29  29  28  30  28    30 29 29 28 30 28 
    
Panel B. Two-Year Predictions     
    
Issuers  -2.11 -2.79 -1.64 -1.23       -19.53 -23.06  -19.47  -17.33     
Non-Issuers -0.57  -0.30  0.53 0.14        -3.32 0.90 4.89 -7.28     
Bootstrap  
p-value 
(0.14) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)       (0.17) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08)     
#  of  firms  24  25  25  28        24 25 25 28     
    
Panel C. Three-Year Predictions     
    
Issuers  -1.01 -1.94 -1.88 -1.43       -17.21 -21.02  -18.30  -15.40     
Non-Issuers -0.70  -0.10  -0.49 0.41        -12.84  -1.56 -6.92 -4.86     
Bootstrap  
p-value 
(0.72) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01)       (0.63) (0.10) (0.18) (0.13)     
#  of  firms  17  28  28  24        17 28 28 24     
1 Price deflated error is computed as the actual earning per share minus the mean forecasted earning per share divided by the 
stock price the month in which the prediction is made. Thus, a negative forecast error implies optimistic bias. 
2 Forecast deflated error is computed as the actual earning per share minus the mean forecasted earning per share divided by 
the absolute value of the forecasted earning. Thus, a negative forecast error implies optimistic bias. 
 
In panel B of table 4, two-year prediction errors for issuing firms with positive 
earnings are compared with forecast errors for control groups. For predictions made the year 
prior to the offering the difference is not significant however, two-year forecasts made the 
year of the offering and the following one present an optimistic bias significantly higher for 
issuers than for non-issuers. Panel B of table 5 reports three-year forecast errors for offering 
firms with positive earning and the error for control groups. The year prior to the offering the 
difference is not significant. In relation to three-year predictions made the year of the offering 
and the following one, the optimistic bias is larger for issuing companies, although the 
difference is not statistically significant when the error is scaled by the absolute value of 
forecasted earning. In general, analysts’ predictions for issuer firms are more optimistic than 
for non-issuers, even after controlling for the higher optimistic bias of companies with 
negative earnings.   15
4.2.  Multivariate analysis 
The tests presented thus far are univariate tests. To better isolate the effect of the equity 
issue in forecast errors, in this section we run multivariate regressions with a pooled sample of 
information from both issuing and non-issuing companies. We estimate cross-sectional time 
series regressions of forecast errors using the following model with company fixed effects,  
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   (1) 
where , it FE  is the mean one-year forecast error for company i in year t, and where t goes from 
the year previous to the offering to the third year following it. Since in this analysis we 
compare forecast errors not only between issuers and non-issuers but also over time, we do not 
consider appropriate to scale prediction errors by price, given that fluctuations in stock prices 
along time could distort results. Thus, forecast errors are deflated by the absolute value of 
forecasted earning. 
Equation (1) does not try to explain what determines the forecast error in general. We 
are only interest in the effect of the equity issue in forecast errors so we use a model with 
company fixed effects. The introduction of the individual effects  i η  in the regression let us to 
control for individual characteristics which affect forecast errors. 
We introduce temporal dummy variables to analyse the evolution of forecast errors 
around the offering. Concretely,  , it YO  equals one for the year of the offering and  , 1it Y ,  , 2it Y  
, 3it Y  take value one for the year one, two and three after the issue, respectively. Moreover, to 
compare errors between issuers and non-issuers we define the dummy variables  , it I  and  , it NI  
which equal one for issuers and non-issuers, respectively. 
Table 5 shows the estimates of regression (1). We observe that forecast errors for 
issuing companies are significant more negative the years following the equity issue, 
consistent with the argument that in the years after the offering the excessive good 
expectations about issuing firms’ earnings are not confirmed. The evolution of forecast errors 
for non-issuers companies does not present any pattern. We test the equality of temporal 
dummies coefficients between issuing and non-issuing firms, observing that issuing firms’ 
coefficients are statistically more negative for the three years following the issue. This result   16
confirms the higher optimistic bias in analysts’ predictions for companies that issue equity. 
Controlling for company fixed effects, however, does not control for the striking 
differences observed in the forecast accuracy of analysts for profits versus losses. Concretely, 
as we comment in the previous section, the optimistic bias in forecast errors is higher when the 
actual earning is negative. In this sense, the more negative issuing firms’ forecast errors for the 
years following the offering could be in part due to firms with losses after the equity issue. 
We add the dummy explanatory variable , it LOSS  in the regression to control for this 
effect. This variable takes value one if the actual earning of company i in period t is negative.  
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  (2) 
Results of regression (2) illustrate that the estimate coefficients  0 0   ( ,) IN I ββ of the 
, it LOSS dummy are negative and highly significant. Thus, predictions errors are more negative 
for companies with losses both for issuers and non-issuers. This result confirms that the 
optimistic bias in forecast error is higher when the actual earning is negative. However, even 
after controlling for the higher optimistic bias of companies with losses, forecast errors for 
issuing companies the years following the offering are significant more negative. So we can 
conclude that the overoptimistic bias in issuing firms’ predictions after the offering is not 
exclusively due to firms with negative earnings. 
The coefficients of temporal dummies for non-issuers are not significant, denoting that 
there is not a pattern in forecast errors for non issuing firms. We also test for regression (2) the 
equality of temporal dummies coefficients between issuing and non-issuing companies. We 
observe that issuing firms’ coefficients are statistically more negative for the three years 
following the issue, confirming that forecast errors for post-issue issuing firms’ earnings 
present higher optimistic bias. 
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TABLE 5. CROSS-SECTIONAL TIME-SERIES REGRESSIONS OF FORECAST ERRORS 




Model (1)  Model (2) 
Variable Coefficient  t-Statistic  p-value  Coefficient  t-Statistic  p-value 
, , 0
it it YI ×   -0.31 -0.74 0.46  0.03  0.10  0.92 
., 1
it it YI ×   -0.93 -2.20 0.03  -0.59 -1.68  0.09 
, , 2
it it Y I ×   -1.03 -2.47 0.01  -0.59 -1.99  0.05 
, , 3
it it Y I ×   -2.44 -5.80 0.00  -1.75 -3.52  0.00 
, , 0
it it YN I ×   0.14 0.35 0.72 0.09 0.35 0.72 
., 1
it it YN I ×   0.45 1.07 0.29 0.18 0.94 0.35 
, , 2
it it Y NI ×   0.40 0.94 0.35 0.18 0.94 0.35 
, , 3
it it Y NI ×   0.31 0.70 0.48 0.10 0.53 0.59 
, , it it LOSS I ×       -2.98  -3.14  0.00 
, , it it LOSS NI ×       -1.87  -3.30  0.00 
        
Wald Coefficient Tests 
Null Hypothesis  F.stat.  Probability    F.stat.  Probability   
1I β = 1NI β   0.60 0.44    0.02 0.88   
2I β = 2NI β   5.35 0.02    3.72 0.05   
3I β = 3NI β   5.77 0.02    4.75 0.03   
4I β = 4NI β   20.1 0.00    12.16  0.00   
0I β = 0NI β       1.01  0.32   
1 We estimate the regression using White’s covariance estimator consistent to heterokedasticity. 
 
4.3.  Long-run abnormal returns and forecasting errors 
Results in previous epigraphs show that analysts are overly optimistic about issuing 
firms’ future earnings. Now we want to analyse if this excessive optimism explains the 
negative long-run abnormal returns of issuing firms the years following the offering. In order 
to study the relation between the prediction errors and the issuing firms’ long-run returns we 
compute the following regression: 
,, α+βε ii ACoR FE ττ =+    18
where  , i ACoR τ  is the abnormal compound return of firm i in the analysis period τ  calculated 
as the compound return of the issuing firm i minus the compound return of a size portfolio. 
We consider as analysis periods the year, two years and three years following the offering. 
, i FE τ  is the error, for company i, made by analysts for a forecast window of τ .  
Panel A of table 6 reports the results of the regression when the analysis period to 
calculate abnormal returns,τ , is the year following the issue. To compute forecast errors we 
consider one-year predictions about issuing firms’ earnings made by analysts the year of the 
offering and the following one. The coefficient β  in the regression is significantly positive for 
every selected date, either if errors are deflated by price or by forecasted earning. Moreover, 
we have computed the Spearman correlation coefficient between abnormal returns and 
forecast errors, being the sign of this coefficient significantly positive. So from these results 
we can conclude that higher the optimistic bias (more negative forecast errors) lower the long-
run returns. 
Panel B of table 6 shows results when τ  is the two-year period following the offering. 
In this case, we consider two-year predictions made by analysts the issue year and the 
following one. Panel C reports results when the analysis period is the three-year period 
following the offering and we use three-year predictions made by analysts the year of the 
offering and the following one. In both panels, theβ  coefficient in the regression as wells as 
the Spearman correlation coefficient between abnormal returns and forecast errors present a 
significant positive sign, either if errors are deflated by price or by forecasted earning.  
Results in this epigraph are consistent with the argument of the excessive optimism 







                                                 
12 Similar results are obtained when abnormal returns are computed using to estimate expected returns BTM 
portfolios or Size-BTM portfolios.    19
 
TABLE 6. RELATION BETWEEN FORECAST ERRORS AND ISSUING FIRMS ABNORMAL 
RETURNS 
 
  Price Deflated Error    Forecast Deflated Error 
Prediction date  month pre.  month post.  year +1    month pre.  month post.  year +1 
        
Panel A. One-Year Predictions        
            
# of firms  34  34  33    34  34  33 
β   0.38 0.39 0.42    0.45 0.38 0.36 
t est.  2.31**  2.36**  2.55**    2.85***  2.22**  2.08** 
Spearman corr.  0.41**  0.42**  0.45***    0.35**  0.38**  0.38** 
        
Panel B. Two-Year Predictions        
            
# of firms  33  33  35    33  33  35 
β   0.36 0.34 0.50    0.32 0.34 0.46 
t est.  2.18**  2.06**  3.29***    1.87*  2.07**  2.91*** 
Spearman  corr.  0.45*** 0.38** 0.49***    0.55*** 0.45*** 0.53*** 
        
Panel C. Three-Year Predictions        
            
# of firms  34  34  30    34  34  30 
β   0.33 0.41 0.44    0.35 0.35 0.37 
t est.  2.02*  2.61**  2.69**    2.12**  2.09**  2.17** 
Spearman corr.  0.47***  0.47***  0.54***    0.54***  0.56***  0.60*** 
     *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
5.  Market reaction to post-issue earnings announcements 
An additional test of the optimistic expectations hypothesis involves an examination of 
abnormal stocks returns at earnings announcements subsequent to the issue. If investors have 
optimistic expectations regarding future earnings they will be unpleasantly surprised at the 
time of earnings announcements in the post-issue period. We analyse the market reaction to 
the four subsequent annual earning announcements, employing standard event-study 
methodology. 
The valuation effect to each earning announcements is evaluated from the analysis of 
daily abnormal returns  around the event day.  In particular,  we  study abnormal returns  in the    20
window (-5, +5), where the day 0 is the kth earning announcement following the offering 
(k = 1…4). Abnormal returns are calculated employing the market model to estimate expected 
returns, 
,, , ()
it it i i Mt AR R a bR =−+   
where , it AR and  , it R are the abnormal return and the real return of firm i in day t, respectively, 
, M t R  is the market portfolio return in day t, and  , ii ab  are the ordinary least squared estimated 
coefficients of the market model.  The estimation period for the market model comes from the 
day t = -150 through t = -6, where t = 0 is the kth earning announcement following the 
offering. 
To test if daily abnormal returns are statistically different form zero we employ the 
parametric test of Boehmer et al. (1991) that takes into account the change in variance of 
returns induced by the event and the cross-section heterocedasticity of prediction errors. We 
complete the analysis of daily abnormal returns around the earning announcements with the 
non-parametric test of Corrado (1989).  
Additionally, the market response to post-issue earning announcements can also be 
measured examining cumulative abnormal returns in different windows within the event 
period. In particular, cumulative abnormal return in the window  12 (, ) tt  is computed as 
2
1




CAR t t AR
=
=∑ . 
Table 7 reports the results of the market reaction to the four post-issue annual earning 
announcements. When we analyse the effect of the first announcement following the offering, 
we observe that the mean cross-sectional abnormal return is negative from day -1 to day +3, 
being statistically significant in the announcement day both with the Boehmer et al. test and 
with the Corrado test. We also examine cumulative abnormal returns in three windows within 
the event period. We observe that cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement day 
are also significantly negative with both tests.  21 
 
 
TABLE 7. MARKET REACTION TO POST-ISSUE EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
  1
















t AR (%) Boehmer Corrado   
t AR (%) Boehmer Corrado   
t AR (%) Boehmer Corrado   
t AR (%) Boehmer Corrado 
-5  0.44 0.95 1.03    0.31 0.39 -0.27    0.04 0.98 1.54    -0.26  -0.64  -0.18 
-4  0.32 0.44 1.33    0.40 1.11 0.38    -0.02 -0.48 0.53    -0.09 -0.16  0.24 
-3  -0.13 -0.80 -0.29    0.24  0.19  1.25    0.15 0.91 0.76    0.13 0.77 -0.06 
-2  0.01 0.50 0.81    0.07 1.11 0.56    0.23 0.77 0.36    0.00 0.32 -0.02 
-1  -0.23 -1.10 -1.02    -0.21 -0.23 0.49    -0.58 -2.31** -1.35    -0.45  -1.47 -2.56*** 
0  -1.12 -2.30**  -2.48**    -0.75 -2.24** -1.91    -0.60 -1.68 -1.51    -0.71  -3.18***  -2.62*** 
+1  -0.57  -1.80*  -1.53    -0.29 -0.89 -0.57    -0.38 -1.53 -1.92    -0.37 -0.94 -0.87 
+2  -0.46 -1.10 -1.23    -0.02 -0.54 -0.48    -0.36 -0.93 -0.56    -0.14 -0.36  0.42 
+3  -0.10 -0.30 -0.05    0.02 -0.23 0.36    -0.27 -1.24 -1.29    0.30  0.90  1.24 
+4  0.20 0.75 1.45    0.31 0.84 0.67    0.14 0.41 0.89    0.21 1.21 0.88 
+5  0.26 0.43 0.14    0.56 1.62 1.40    0.18 0.92 1.18    -0.01  -0.45  -0.39 
                       
(-1,1) -1.92  -2.71**  -2.91***    -1.25  -1.92*  -1.15  -1.56  -3.25***  -2.76***   -1.54  -3.13***  -3.49*** 
(-1,0) -1.69 -2.98***  -2.84***    -1.04 -2.76***  -1.75*   -0.98  -2.29***  -2.43***   -1.08  -2.75*** -2.47*** 
(0,1)  -1.35  -3.10***  -2.48**    -0.96 -1.49 -1.00   -1.18  -3.16*** -2.02**   -1.16  -3.34***  -3.67*** 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 22 
Results for the second, third and fourth post-issue earning announcement also 
show a negative market reaction. For every announcement we observe that abnormal 
returns are negative the days around it, being statistically significant the day of the 
announcement for the second a fourth earning announcement. However, for the third 
post-issue earning announcement the negative market reaction is significant for the day 
before the announcement. This result can be due to leaked information before the 
announcement or to an inaccurate earning announcement date. 
Cumulative abnormal returns around the second, third and fourth post-issue 
announcements are also significantly negative corroborating that the market is 
unpleasantly surprised within earnings announcement windows following equity rights 
issues. These results are also consistent with the market being overly optimistic about 
the long-term prospects of issuing firms at the time of the offering. 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we document that equity rights issuers underperform in the long-
run and we test if the origin of this pattern is the excessive optimism about issuing 
firms’ prospects. For that, firstly, we examine analysts’ predictions about future 
earnings of these companies. Our results show that both short and long-term earning 
forecasts for rights issuing firms are unusually favourable in relation to predictions for 
non-issuers. Moreover, we find a significant relation between the optimism in forecast 
errors and long-run returns of rights issuers; in particular, higher the optimistic bias in 
analysts’ predictions lower the long-run returns. These results suggest that the 
explanation of the poor long-run rights issuing firms’ underperformance is the excessive 
optimism about future earnings of these companies. 
Secondly, we examine the market reaction to the fourth post-issue annual 
earning announcements as additional test of the optimistic expectations hypothesis. We 
observe that the market is unpleasantly surprised at the time of earning announcements 
in the post-issue period. This finding reinforces our conclusion of the market being 
overly optimistic regarding future earnings and being disappointed by the lower 
earnings realized by firms following seasoned equity offerings.  
  23
Overall, our results lead to the conclusion that the rights issuers’ 
underperformance is due, at least in part, to investors having overestimated the future 























APPENDIX. CORRELATION BETWEEN FORECAST ERRORS AND ACTUAL OR 




Panel A. One-Year Predictions 
  1 2 3 4 
1. Error deflated by stock price  --  0.922***  0.224***  0.349*** 
2. Error deflated by forecasted earning    --  0.023  -0.03 
3. Actual Earning to Price ratio      --  0.713*** 
4. Forecasted Earning to price ratio         -- 
 
Panel B. Two-Year Predictions 
  1 2 3 4 
1. Error deflated by stock price  --  0.906***  0.176***  0.266*** 
2. Error deflated by forecasted earning    --  -0.048  -0.093 
3. Actual Earning to Price ratio      --  0.445*** 
4. Forecasted Earning to price ratio         -- 
 
Panel C. Three-Year Predictions 
  1 2 3 4 
1. Error deflated by stock price  --  0.918***  0.157***  0.254*** 
2. Error deflated by forecasted earning    --  -0.067  -0.083 
3. Actual Earning to Price ratio      --  0.405*** 
4. Forecasted Earning to price ratio         -- 
1 We consider appropriate Spearman correlation coefficient due to non-normality distribution of forecast errors. We compute, for 
every firm in IBES database, two and three- year forecast errors in December of each year in the sample period. 
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